【轉貼】「後中國」世界

「後中國」世界The Post-China World　●Newsweek / Ruchir Sharma / 雲程譯（2010.06.20）


【Comment】
感謝網友Silly報知此文。在中國經濟前景未明（不一定硬著陸，但注定反轉往下）時，這時候，不是該築防火牆嗎？快速強簽ECFA到底對不對，已經呼之欲出。將全部籌碼押在中國，是押在「過去」而不是「未來」。這就是中國文化的特點：向過去看齊。我們購買共同基金時，金管會不總是要求說明書一定要有這行字：「基金過去的表現並不表示將來亦會有類似的業績，詳情請細閱****投資者認購章程及財務報表。」



「後中國」世界　●Newsweek / Ruchir Sharma雲程譯（2010.06.20）

現在已經能看到風潮將結束，餘波將緩慢蕩漾在全球。

十年來全球經濟興起的方式，將暗示其如何結束。2000年時，盎格魯‧撒克遜經濟模式如日中天，科技革命則席捲全球。新興國家只是敲敲華爾街嘉年華會的邊鼓，吸引不到全球股市5％的資金。再十年前，大家注目的焦點是訓練有素，一個重新定義上世紀 80年代全球經濟舞台明星的日本。即使在1992年美國總統大選中，一名候選人也說：「冷戰已經結束，日本贏了。」但今天，日本已被刷掉，所有人都一個勁的羨慕中國蓬勃發展，其強大的力量也提昇了其他經濟體系的表現。資源豐富的國家如巴西和澳大利亞，透過銷售鐵礦石，銅和其他商品給中國支撐其經濟奇蹟，還讓全球經濟讚譽有加。很多大喀投資者相信：由投資帶動的中國繁榮會持續下去。

目前，中國經濟中的投資佔45％，無論是在中國和任何經濟大國，都是史無前例的高。然而，中國能夠連續保持這個支出速度數年之久，主要因為它已將多數的農村經濟產業化。藉由釋放許多農村勞動力到新興製造業都市的新工廠，政府可繼續挹注大量資金蓋公路和工廠。分析家估計，2008年全球經濟衰退將削減需求，而中國的出口和經濟會被拖下來。的確，中國的出口大幅的下降，但中國領導層反而啟動大規模經濟刺激計劃，提出更多的基礎設施支出，擴大投資熱潮，並保持長期年度經濟成長在夢寐以求的8％以上。

但現在，越來越多的證據顯示：中國的經濟成長的「奇蹟」已抵達趨緩的邊緣，過去幾十年10％成長速度可能在今後幾年下降到6％或7％之譜。最近的罷工潮，已讓建立在廉價勞動力和出口的中國模式出現問題。中國支出的成長速度即將放慢，因為中國只能有這麼多新的高速公路、鐵路、港口，更別說土地和勞動成本急劇上升。政府在所有這些領域的目標消費正在縮小，中國已有超過 65,000公里的快速公路，直追美國的80,000多公里，是世界第二大路網。相對於2007年增加8,000公里，2008年增加6,000多公里，中國交通運輸部新建高速公路計劃從 2010年起每年只有5,000公里。鐵路的支出也很可能在今年達到頂峰。金融危機後，銀行也面臨著更大的信貸管制和更高的準備金要求，這些都將進一步減緩投資。

因此，未來 10年的場景很可能是：中國成長的驅動力熄火。相信經濟能夠接近兩位數的速度持續成長的人往往主張：中國可以靠消費支出取代投資，以國內市場取代出口。假使成功的話，這不僅重塑中國而且也會重塑世界的經濟，讓更多相互競爭的西方國家更多機會來出口給中國的消費者。但這種希望是建立在一個很大的神話，亦即：中國已能有意的壓制消費經濟的興起。經過30年，現在中國的消費開支成長已堅實的達到調整過的通貨膨脹率近9％左右。其成長速度再快的話，將會以一種危險的方式，違反經濟發展的歷史。

中國緩慢增長的消費經濟神話，是建立在誤導性的數據上。消費支出的確在2008年下降為史無前例的低水準：36％，但這僅僅是因為投資支出成長明顯高於消費增長。這是快速工業化經濟體的典型；，日本和台灣在其20年「奇蹟」成長中也有類似的狀況，但中國更依賴投資支出和出口。日本和台灣的消費者支出成長速度，沒有一年超過10％，所以中國不太可能更快。

目前，中國似乎已達到一個關鍵的轉折點，它已經太大，無法繼續快速成長。當70年代中期日本的國民平均收入和今天的中國類似（以目前的美元計算為4,000美元），之後其投資開支明顯減緩，經濟的整體成長速度，從長期的9％降到至5％。

當然，兩者仍有很大的不同。比起70年代中期日本的55％，中國只有46％的人口生活在城市裡，中國透過城市化，經濟成長還有更大的發展空間。不過，趨勢線十分明確。雖然出口到2010年已回升，但未來的成長是有限的，因為中國佔全球市場的10％，已是世界上最大的出口國。最後，中國將被迫重新評估其貨幣，華盛頓很希望中國（因人民幣升值）使其出口減少競爭力，而增加消費在經濟中的比重，並將經濟成長降到自然狀態。

中國的罷工潮只會助長這一趨勢。勞工的議價能力將會增加，部分原因是嚴格執行「一胎政策」縮小了勞動力的規模。未來10年，只有500萬 35至54歲的人參加中國的核心勞動力；相對的，10年前是 9,000萬人。為補償勞動成長率的下降，工資將快速上升。這意味著一個更加平衡的國內經濟，但它也意味著低階，高成長的製造業將繼續向亞洲和非洲等更便宜的地區轉移。

只要中國領導層注意到的話，這不一定是壞事。外界的人認為中國決策者只關心快速增成長，而不重視社會穩定，也不關注勞動市場迅速萎縮和隨遲緩而來的通貨膨脹。在借貸成本非常低的狀態下，主要城市的不動產價格飆升，讓更多口袋滿滿的中國人購買了好幾戶房子。2003年和2008年之間不動產價格增加一倍後，在過去 12個月中，各大城市的房地產價格仍飆漲30％以上，使絕大多數人越來越多買不起房子。最流行的電視節目「蝸居」（蝸牛的家），描繪一般中國人對不動產價格狂飆的絕望。為了讓建商降價，政府嚴厲打擊，提高頭期款並停止一些新項目的貸款。鑑於中國經濟中不動產投資佔了三分之一，中國的經濟成長必然減緩。

諷刺的是，中國在面對成長的挑戰時要比外國人更開放和更誠實。對此，中國股市是很好的指標。中國股市對外仍相當封閉，持續低檔好幾個月而返回一年前的水準。但在世界各地，認為這齣中國將持續繁榮的「中國戲」或投資，持續上漲到4月，今天也依然遠高於一年前的水準。這齣戲包括了從主要原料出口國的貨幣，到商品股市在內。中國在最近的一次會議上，主要礦業公司執行長預測中國成長從10％降到6％，有如一列時速70 -100公里的火車撞牆。他說，結果是一樣的。

沒有什麼比這更離譜了。例如中國經濟成長趨緩，可翻轉世界的原料生產者。2000年，在商品價格持續20年下降後，他們投資很少，幾乎沒有人預見到來自中國即將繁榮的需求。很意外的，當這需求來臨時，油價狂飆產生價格暴利。現在從鐵礦石到石油和銅的原料廠商，以預期中國需求暴增而增加產能，可能無法實現。

減緩的中國經濟可能衝擊這些過去 10年的明星國家，包括澳大利亞和巴西。中國佔全球大多數工業原料需求的30％至60％，澳大利亞原料出口佔其總出口的百分之64％，巴西則為55％。今天，看巴西和澳大利亞的基本面很棒，每個國家都在尋找高峰。澳大利亞，為中國採金屬礦製造就業機會和投資，認為自己真是個「幸運的國家」。巴西希望今年成長率能飆升到7％到8％，使其成為全球投資者的寵兒。但澳大利亞和巴西正面臨經常帳赤字，這表示他們未從最近意外的原料銷售潮中存下老本，更認為中國的繁榮沒有終點。但他們不是特例。在過去十年中，中國持續增長的需求佔了全球石油飆漲需求近半；假設石油價格將繼續上升，可以支撐從俄羅斯到委內瑞拉國家預算的支出。但中國經濟一旦趨緩，可能在瞬間改變這一切。

對投資者而言，已經到了去思考「中國劇」的世界是怎樣的時候了。在某個層次上，這表示著：即使經濟成長趨緩，中國市場也仍繼續成長。舉例而言，如電腦和液晶電視，仍舊有廣泛、未滿足的需求。在另一個層面上，原料進口國能夠受益於價格的下降，如印度和巴西。商品價格下降，而舒緩通貨膨脹壓力，很可能會是這些國家成長的主要障礙。（此段是反諷）

假使中國經濟減緩是快速的硬著陸，所有人都受害。一些人，即中國，認為自己它可以避開，理由是榮景的規模大到不行，還有相關的信貸過度。一位評論家將中國可能低於8％的官方增長目標，與好萊塢驚悚片《捍衛戰警》（Speed）做比較，片中壞人在公車上設置一枚炸彈，如果車輛減到時速 50英里以下便引爆。在中國，炸彈可能因創造就業機會下降和罷工潮而被引爆。

目前辯論中國前途只有兩個陣營，非常樂觀的佔多數，少數很尖銳、悲觀，但事實可能介於中間。中國很可能像在上世紀 70年代中期的日本，當時日本開始往下降，但仍然是有引人注目的15年成長。過去十年來，中國佔全球經濟比重增加了一倍以上，但仍然只是8.5％。如果中國未來幾年順利過渡到6％或7％的成長，它也有可能不會是件災難，可能只有那些將所有籌碼押在中國過去10年經驗（成長將持續不停）的人來說會是災難。





The Post-China World　●Newsweek / Ruchir Sharma（2010.06.20）

The end of the boom is now in sight, and the ripple effects of slower growth will span the globe.

The way the global economy begins a decade reveals little about how it will end. In 2000, the Anglo-Saxon economic model was ascendant and the tech revolution was sweeping the globe. Emerging nations were a mere sideshow to the great Wall Street carnival, attracting less than 5 percent of the money in global stock markets. A decade earlier, the spotlight was trained on Japan , a star that had redefined the global economic stage in the 1980s. As late as the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign, one candidate reviewed the performance this way: “The Cold War is over and Japan has won.” Today, Japan is widely viewed as a washout, and all admiring eyes are on the boom in China , a force so powerful it has lifted the performance of many other economies. Resource-rich countries like Brazil and Australia have achieved global economic acclaim, mainly by selling iron ore, copper, and other commodities to feed the construction spectacle in China . Many big-name investors believe the China boom is set to continue, driven by investment spending. Investment now represents 45 percent of the Chinese economy, a level that is historically unprecedented, both in China and in any major economy. Yet China has been able to maintain this rate of spending for several years in a row, mainly because it has been industrializing a largely rural economy. With many laborers still available to move to new factories in manufacturing boomtowns, the government could keep pouring money into highways and factories. Analysts expected that the global recession of 2008 would cut demand for Chinese exports and drag the economy down. Exports did drop sharply, but the Chinese leadership launched a massive stimulus plan, centered around yet more infrastructure spending, extending the investment boom, and keeping economic growth above the long-cherished annual goal of at least 8 percent.

Now, however, evidence is mounting that China’s growth “miracle” is on the verge of a major slowdown, which could bring the 10 percent growth rate of recent decades down to 6 or 7 percent in coming years. Recent high-profile labor strikes have dramatically called into question the China model, built on cheap labor and exports. And the rate of growth in spending is about to slow, because there are only so many new highways, railways, and ports China can build, and because land and labor costs are rising sharply. Government targets for spending in all these areas are shrinking; the mainland already has more than 65,000 kilometers of highways, the second-largest network behind the United States’ 80,000-plus kilometers. After adding more than 6,000 kilometers in 2008 and 8,000 kilometers in 2007, China’s ministry of transportation plans to construct only 5,000 kilometers of new highways per year from 2010 onward. Spending on railways is also likely to peak this year. In the wake of the financial crisis, banks are also facing greater credit controls and higher reserve requirements, which will further slow investment.

So the story of the coming decade could well be that China runs out of growth drivers. Those who believe the economy can keep growing at close to double-digit rates often argue that it can do this by replacing investment with consumer spending, and exports with domestic sales. This would rebalance the economy not only of China but also of the world, giving struggling Western economies more opportunity to sell to Chinese consumers. But this hope is built on a big myth, namely that China has deliberately prevented the emergence of a consumer economy. For the last 30 years now, Chinese consumer spending has increased at a robust inflation-adjusted rate of nearly 9 percent a year. For it to grow any faster would defy the history of economic development, in a dangerous way.

The myth of China’s slow-growth consumer economy is built on misleading data. Consumer spending did fall as a share of the economy in 2008 to a record low of 36 percent but only because growth in investment spending was much higher than growth in consumption. This is typical of rapidly industrializing economies; during their decades of “miracle” growth, Japan and Taiwan had a similar profile, though China is even more dependent on investment spending and exports. Consumer spending in Japan and Taiwan never grew faster than 10 percent a year, and it’s not likely to accelerate much faster in China .

Now China appears to be reaching a critical turning point, at which it has become too big to continue growing so rapidly. When Japan’s per capita income in the mid-70s reached levels similar to those of China today ($ 4,000 in current dollar terms), investment spending slowed down markedly and so did the economy’s overall growth rate from a trend rate of 9 percent to 5 percent.

There are big differences, of course. Only 46 percent of China’s population lives in cities, compared with 55 percent in mid-70s Japan , leaving more room to grow through urbanization. Still, the trend line is clear. Though exports have rebounded in 2010, there are limits to future growth, as China is already the world’s largest exporter with a 10 percent share of the global market. Eventually, China will be forced to revalue its currency, as Washington would very much like it to, and that will make exports less competitive, increasing the consumption share of the economy, with slower growth the natural result.

The unrest among Chinese workers will only fuel this trend. The bargaining power of labor will increase, in part because tight enforcement of the one-child policy is shrinking the size of the workforce. Only 5 million people age 35 to 54 will join China’s core labor force this decade, versus 90 million in the previous decade. Wages will have to rise a lot faster to compensate for the fall in the growth rate of labor. That will mean a more balanced domestic economy, but it also will mean that low-end, high-growth manufacturing will continue to migrate to cheaper parts of Asia and Africa .

That’s not necessarily a bad thing, as far as the Chinese leadership is concerned. Outsiders who think Chinese policymakers care only about fast growth miss the growing focus on social stability, and concern about how quickly the labor market tightened and inflation surfaced after the downturn. Property prices have rocketed in the major cities as the more cash-rich Chinese have been buying multiple homes, encouraged by the very low cost of borrowing. After doubling between 2003 and 2008, property prices in premier cities rose by more than 30 percent on average over the past 12 months, making houses increasingly unaffordable for the vast majority. The most popular television show these days is Woju, or “Snail’s Home,” which depicts the despair of average Chinese people amid spiraling apartment prices. To get developers to cut back prices, the government is cracking down hard, increasing minimum down-payment requirements and suspending lending for some new projects. Given that property constitutes a third of all investment spending in China , growth will inevitably slow.

Ironically, the Chinese are far more open and honest about the growth challenges they face than outsiders are. One good indicator of this phenomena is that China’s stock market, still largely closed to outsiders, has been drifting lower for months, retracing its way to levels seen a year ago. But across the world, “China plays,” or investments that assume a continued boom in China , kept rallying through April, and today remain much higher than they were a year ago. Those plays range from currencies of major commodity-exporting nations to various materials stocks. At a recent China conference, a leading mining-company executive compared talk of China slowing from 10 percent to 6 percent growth to speculation about a train hitting someone at 100 or 70 kilometers an hour. The end result is the same, he argued.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Slower growth in China could, for example, upend the world of commodity producers. In 2000, they were investing very little following a 20-year secular decline in commodity prices, and hardly anyone foresaw the coming boom in demand from China . When it arrived, unexpected, the spike in prices lead to windfall profits. Now producers of commodities from iron ore to oil and copper have been adding capacity based largely on expected demand from China that may not materialize.

A slowdown in China could shock the star economies of the past decade, including Australia and Brazil . China accounts for 30 to 60 percent of global demand for most industrial commodities, and commodity exports account for 64 percent of exports from Australia , 55 percent from Brazil . Today the fundamentals look great in Brazil and Australia , but every country always looks best at its peak. Australia , now more than ever, considers itself the “Lucky Country,” as mining metals for China generates jobs and investment. Brazil expects blowout growth of 7 to 8 percent this year, making it a current darling of global investors. Both Australia and Brazil are running current account deficits, suggesting they have saved little of the windfall from recent commodity sales and expect no end to the China boom. They are far from alone. Rising demand from China has accounted for nearly half the jump in global oil demand over the past decade, and the assumption that oil prices will keep rising underpins the budget outlays of countries from Russia to Venezuela . A slowdown in China could change all this in a flash.

For investors, the time has come to think of a world beyond “China plays.” At one level, this implies looking at markets in China that may grow even if the economy slows. One example could be PCs and LCD TVs, for which there is still wide, unmet demand. At another level, it means looking at commodity-importing countries that could benefit from a decline in prices, like India and Brazil . A decline in commodity prices would ease inflationary pressures that can be one of the major obstacles to growth in these nations.

No one gains if the slowdown comes hard and fast, and some China bears think it will, given the scale of the boom and the related credit excesses. One commentator compares China’s possible fall below the 8 percent official growth target to the Hollywood thriller Speed, in which a bomb on a bus is set to detonate if the vehicle slows to below 50 miles an hour. In China , the bomb would be triggered by the slump in job creation and explode in the form of labor unrest.

The current debate on China’s future has just two camps, the extremely bullish majority and a very shrill, bearish minority, but the truth may lie in the middle. China could well be like Japan in the mid-1970s, a period when Japan began to downshift, but remained a compelling growth story for 15 years. China’s share of global economic output has more than doubled in the last decade, but is still just 8.5 percent. If China moves smoothly to 6 or 7 percent growth in the coming years, it will hardly be a cataclysmic event, except possibly for those who have bet it all on the story of the last decade.

Sharma is head of emerging markets at Morgan Stanley investment management.

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/20/the-post-china-world.html