以下（見大圖）是修改網友Fant1408 ( )之「解放軍情報單位在台活動關係圖」，增加「中國光彩事業促進會」與「台灣光彩促進會」資料；孫春蘭業已升任中央統戰部部長，與頂新魏家關係良好，可能取代劉延東，為中國光彩事業促進會現任會長；馬政府至今無人敢認，誰推薦陳元玲為NCC委員，很有可能在掩飾中共的人事安排。
中國大陸參與了對台政治戰爭或者為其提供了掩護的部門顯然非常之多，然而，近年來仍有一個組織表現非常突出，這就是中華能源基金委員會，一個在香港註冊的非政府組織，在它的自我定位裏，它將自己說成是一個智庫機構。中華能源基金委員會與全球多家機構與政府具有「合作關係」，其中包括大量中國高校、漢辦、石油公司、蘭德公司、加拿大國王議會辦公室，還有聯合國經濟與社會委員會。
本部落格之發文，早已表明「無償分享、限非商業使用」為原則，歡迎「全文轉貼」。本文自26日發文以來，經一些網友轉貼至PTT（如例一、例二、例三、例四）、臉書及其他地方，看見國人逐漸重視並開始討論此一議題，本該欣喜。
然而27日下午，卻看見《民報》網頁刊載此文，一字不漏，竟冠上作者「李茂玄」之名，甚至又轉載至《雅虎奇摩》與MSN新聞網站供「商業使用」；經查「李茂玄」其人，有可能為資深媒體人（如這裡、這裡）。
這裡不得不還原「被引用的真正作者」：本文在第一段，即提供轉貼「繁體字翻譯」之原始網址鏈結（http://big5.backchina.com/news/2015/03/24/353140.html）；文末也標明「英文原文」係來自J. Michael Cole（http://nationalinterest.org/feature/unstoppable-chinas-secret-plan-subvert-taiwan-12463），並轉貼全文；台北101之21樓圖片，則取自外獨會。其最初的「華文翻譯」作者有可能是《多維新聞》網的編譯蘇希。我們只是「節錄」相關重點，並加上自認應該強調的「標題」。
由於昨天下午通知《民報》，至28日上午10點未獲回應，在此特別說明文章各部分引用的最原始來源。
中華能源基金委員會的董事會主席葉簡明同時也是中國華信的創始人之一，它是中華能源基金委員會的一個分支機構。中國華信是一家坐擁數百億美元的能源公司（2013年它上報了高達2090億人民幣的收入，摺合約334億美元），在世界各地設有多處辦公室，其中也包括位於台北101大樓的第21層的一間（見上圖，中國海洋燃油有限公司台灣辦事處，登記為港商，代理人是張怡）。現年三十八歲的葉簡明沒有更多消息披露，我們只知道他在2003至2005年曾擔任與解放軍總政治部聯絡部有聯繫的中國國際友好聯絡會的副秘書長。根據記者楚博（Andrew Chubb）和剛納特（John Garnaut）的說法，葉簡明可能與解放軍總政治部聯絡部前主任葉選寧有關，或者也有可能是與中國前海軍司令員葉飛上將有關。
中華能源基金委員會的分支機構當中特別值得注意的還有中國文化院。它註冊於2012年，同樣註冊於香港。這是一個負責「推廣中華文化」的受到國家支持的組織，自其創始起，中國文化院就在大陸和台灣兩地舉辦了一系列跨海峽文化交流活動，參與其中的有來自兩岸的學生、學者、娛樂界人士和宗教界人士。
在台灣方面，親北京的中國時報集團和贊成統一的佛光山文教基金會對這些活動提供了贊助，例如2015年1月在台南舉辦的「高校學生文化體驗營」，二者就擔任了合作贊助商角色。根據福布斯雜誌的統計，中國時報集團主席蔡衍明為台灣首富，有80億美元資產。
其他活動，比如2014年10月在福建省福州市舉辦的「促進文化整合增進文化認同」沙龍，則是由中華能源基金委員會和中國華藝廣播公司共同出資，後者1991年被解放軍總政治部收編。而具體執行人員則更加耐人尋味，中國華藝廣播公司的CEO王樹（或汪澍）似乎同時也是解放軍總政治部311基地的司令員。該基地由華信培訓中心管理，華信培訓中心則由福建華信控股有限公司注資，這是此前提到的中國華信能源公司的一個子公司。更複雜的是，福建華信控股有限公司的總經理蘭華升同時也是中華能源基金委員會的副秘書長、中國文化院的執行主任、以及自2013年起兩岸舉辦的一系列文化論壇當中的活躍分子。2014年10月，他參與的一個由中國文化院協辦的論壇當中，他的演講題目為「海峽兩岸的四個區：共享同樣的根，實現共同目標」。
位於福州的311基地被認為是「直接針對台灣進行心理操縱和宣傳的前哨」。王樹（或汪澍）也出席了上述論壇，論壇現場坐在他右邊的是與中華能源基金委員會及孔子學院等機構均有聯繫的許嘉璐，他同時也是尼山世界文明論壇的主席。尼山世界文明論壇涵蓋了多個解放軍總政治部聯絡部旗下的組織，其中也包括中華能源基金委員會。許嘉璐還是中華文化發展促進會的主席，該組織在促進海峽「和平」和「重新統一」方面非常活躍。還有人認為，許嘉璐是中國大陸政治戰爭策略的總的設計師。
311基地（也被稱為輿論戰心理戰法律戰基地）的重要性不容低估。作為一個副團級機構，311基地大約發揮著六個常規導彈旅的作用，該基地還積極參與了網路戰。
現在應當清楚了，中華能源基金委員會及其下屬分支機構在聯合了台灣方面的富有合作者以後，已經有了充足的財政資源去投入到針對台灣的政治戰爭當中去。它意在影響相關討論，並抓緊一切可能招募個人。它的複雜性質使得情報部門很難區分它的政治戰爭行動和更多的「合法的」活動。但考慮到我們已知的中華能源基金委員會在財政金融上的操作，很難相信它設在台北的辦公室沒有參與政治戰爭活動。
中華能源基金委員會只是中國大陸用於發動類似活動的許多組織當中的一個，類似的活動在台灣、香港和全球其他地區都有分佈。本文意在揭示中國是如何使用這種策略去欺騙和掩蓋它的真實意圖的，中華能源基金委員會可能被複製成百上千個，而抗擊它們變成了一個幾乎不可能的任務。
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原文：Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan
There is a convoluted network of companies and organizations that could be involved in Beijing's "onion layer" strategy.
J. Michael Cole
March 23, 2015
Mao Zedong reportedly once said that warfare is 70 percent political. Arguably, no conflict in recent times has adhered to this concept more faithfully than China’s ongoing campaign to “reunite” Taiwan with the “Mainland.” While analysts have tended to focus on the threat which an increasingly powerful People’s Liberation Army (PLA) poses to the democratic island-nation, the political warfare component of Beijing’s “reunification” strategy has received much less attention, perhaps because cross-strait symposia on tea and culture are far less “newsworthy” than the latest missile boat or combat aircraft.
Given Beijing’s preference for “nonkinetic” solutions to the impasse (war would be costly and unpredictable), it makes perfect sense that its leadership would explore alternative means by which to win the war in the Taiwan Strait. Political warfare (or the “Three Warfares,” 三战), targeting both Taiwan and its supporters in the international community, is a favored instrument. There has been a growing number of interactions between Taiwan and China since 2008. And what with rapidly expanding cross-strait travel, academic exchanges and investment, the opportunities for China to engage in political warfare have increased exponentially.
Art and culture, benign as they may sound, are at the heart of China’s political-warfare strategy against Taiwan. But don’t be fooled by the innocuous façade provided by the cushy conference halls and beaming university students: Behind all this lies the PLA’s General Political Department Liaison Department (GPD/LD), “an interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, finance, military operations, and intelligence.”
Although the GPD/LD’s remit extends well beyond Taiwan, a large share of its resources is nevertheless committed to resolving the Taiwan “question” on terms that are favorable to Beijing.
The list of Chinese units that engage in or provide cover for political warfare against Taiwan is admittedly a long one. However, one organization that has gained prominence in recent years is the China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC, 中華能源基金委員會), a Hong Kong–registered nongovernmental organization that advertises itself as a think tank (not to be confused with the French CEFC, where I am an associate researcher). A subsidiary of the CEFC China Energy Co., Ltd (Huaxin, 中國華信), the CEFC claims to have “partnerships” with several organizations and government bodies worldwide, including a number of Chinese universities, Hanban, oil companies, Rand Corp, the Privy Council’s Office of Canada, and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The board chairman of the CEFC is Ye Jianming (葉簡明), who is also listed as a founder of the aforementioned Huaxin, a multibillion-dollar energy logistics company (its reported income in 2013 stood at 209 billion renminbi, or US$33.4 billion) with several offices worldwide, including one on the twenty-first floor of the Taipei 101 skyscraper. Not much is known about the thirty-eight-year-old Ye. We know that he was deputy secretary general of the GPD/LD-linked China Association for International Friendly Contacts (CAIFC) from 2003-2005. According to journalists Andrew Chubb and John Garnaut, he may be related to Lt.-Gen. Ye Xuanning, GPD/LD director until 1998, or to Admiral Ye Fei, the PLA Navy commander from 1980 to 1982.
One subsidiary of the CEFC that is of particular interest is the China Institute of Culture Limited (CIOC, 中國文化院). Registered in 2012 (also in Hong Kong), the CIOC is a nationally supported organization in charge of “promoting Chinese culture.” Since its inception, the CIOC has organized—in both China and Taiwan—a series of cross-strait cultural events involving students, academics, entertainers and religious figures from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
On the Taiwan side, the pro-Beijing Want Want China Times Group and pro-unification Fo Guang Shan Foundation for Buddhist Culture and Education (佛光山文教基金會) have sponsored events. Both, for example, were co-sponsors of the “University Students’ Culture Experiencing Camp,” held in Kaohsiung, southern Taiwan, in January 2015. According to Forbes magazine, Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明), chairman of the Want Want China Times Group, is the richest man in Taiwan, with a fortune of US$8 billion.
Other events, such as the “Promoting Cultural Integration and Increasing Cultural Identity” salon held in Fuzhou, Fujian Province in October 2014, were co-organized by the CEFC and China Huayi Broadcasting Corp (CHBC, 中國華藝廣播公司), which was incorporated by the GPD in 1991. And that’s where the constellation of affiliated organizations and operatives gets really interesting. The chief executive officer of CHBC, Wang Shu (汪澍/王樹), also happens to be commander of GPD 311 Base (61716 Unit). The Base is managed by the Huaxin Training Center (华信培训中心), which itself is funded by the Fujian Huaxin (CEFC) Holding Company, a subsidiary of the US$30 billion CEFC China Energy Co discussed earlier. Confused yet? It gets even more complex. Lan Huasheng (蘭華升), the general manager of Fujian Huaxin Holding Company, is also CEFC deputy secretary general, executive director of the CIOC, and an active participant at many of the cultural forums held between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 2013. His speech at a CIOC/CHBC forum in October 2014 was titled “Four Districts of Cross-Straits: Sharing the Same Root, Achieving the Same Goal.”
According to Stokes and Hsiao, the Fuzhou-based 311 Base is “[a]t the forefront of applied psychological operations and propaganda directed against Taiwan.” Wang was present at the aforementioned salon (he is fourth from left in the third picture in the hyperlink above; the man to his right is Xu Jialu [許嘉璐], who is associated with CAIFC, CEFC, Confucius Institutes, and president of the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations (尼山世界文明論壇), which overlaps with several GPD/LD organizations, including CEFC. Xu is also chairman of the China Association for the Promotion of Culture (CAPCC, 中華文化發展促進會), an organization that is actively involved in the promotion of a cross-strait “peace accord” and “re-unification.” It is claimed that Xu “orchestrates” China’s overall political-warfare strategy.
The significance of 311 Base (also known as the Public Opinion, Psychological Operations, and Legal Warfare Base, 輿論戰心理戰法律戰基地) cannot be overstated. As a deputy-corps-level organization, 311 “carries roughly as much status as all those six conventional missile brigades [from the Second Artillery Corps’ Base 52] that target Taiwan combined,” Stokes wrote in an e-mail response. The base is also actively involved in cyber operations.
It should be clear by now that the CEFC and its affiliates, which are joining forces with extraordinarily rich partners in Taiwan, have formidable financial resources at their disposal to engage in political warfare in Taiwan, to shape the discourse and possibly to recruit individuals. The convoluted nature of the network—where global energy firms overlap with think tanks, foundations, the GPD/LD and intelligence operatives—makes it extraordinarily difficult for intelligence agencies (and the less security-aware targets) to distinguish between political warfare and more “legitimate” activities. Given what we know about CEFC China Energy Co and the many GPD/LD-related subsidiaries whose operations it finances, it is difficult to imagine that its office in Taipei is not involved in political warfare.
The CEFC is just one of the many Chinese organizations that engage in such activities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and globally. While it barely scratches the surface, this article demonstrates how China uses an “onion layer” strategy to deceive and overwhelm its adversaries. Multiply the CEFC phenomenon by ten, twenty, fifty, and the task of countering those efforts becomes a nearly impossible one.
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